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INTRODUCTION
There are several primary cartels in Mexico who flourish as suppliers of America's insatiable drug demand, while living under the soft laws of the Mexican government. As observed from U.S. news networks, Mexican cartel reporting focuses on horrific stories of violence between rivals, causing tragic loss of innocent life. Less emphasized is drug abuse in the U.S. and the Mexican Government's inability to stop the cartel drug trade. The former is a domestic, social issue every American must address for the sake of personal health and public safety. The latter is a foreign policy issue, affecting U.S. national security, and requires all instruments of national power to help Mexico end cartel violence, corruption, and economic instability. This paper will focus on cartel economics and recommendations for interdiction. In doing so, it will describe some common cartel business practices, cartel leadership and organization as well as their strengths and weaknesses in shaping the problem.
Next it will illustrate cartel means of influence, impact on Mexico's economy and national security implications. Last, it will recommend long-term solutions for the government of Mexico in order to deny cartel sanctuary to and take control away from the cartels. Current U.S. and Mexican law enforcement efforts will continue to disrupt cartel activity. The implementation of additional initiatives in parallel with law enforcement activities in Mexico is critical for any of them to achieve lasting effects. Pragmatism and brevity demand an initial focal point for Mexico with measured levels of support from the United States. In order to curb cartel influence and negotiate possible reformation without U.S. military intervention, the Mexican government must first interdict illicit finance from the top down, followed by long-term socio-economic improvement of rural Mexico.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT
Since the 1800s, Mexico has maintained a grudge against the U.S. and is unwilling to take advice from America. In 1994, during a discussion about the U.S., the United Nations and Haiti, President Salinas said, "Having suffered an external intervention by the United States, in which we lost more than half of our territory, Mexico cannot accept any proposal for intervention by any nation of the region."
1 An old wound from the Mexican-American
War justifies any underlying anti-American sentiment and adds reason to the following point of view.
2
Given that President Calderon failed to get rid of the cartels, after five years of war, one could contest he is content with the drug trade and, therefore, is unwilling to interrupt the flow of drug money into Mexico. 3 His federal forces restrain only enough cartel activity to support his position on the drug war, but he never puts a dent in the illicit cash flow because it feeds Mexico's ailing economy. 4 The drug violence, far away in the border region to the north, does not compel the government in Mexico City to take any real or definitive action against the cartels. Besides, illicit cash flow (an estimated 30-40 billion USD a year at best) has a stabilizing effect on the Mexican economy.
5
This visceral and cynical point of view is very plausible if the observer can divorce him or herself from the political realities the United States and Mexico share as border countries. It may feed one's desire to take punitive action against the Mexican government for its role in the U.S. drug problem, but it hardly considers that cartel influence did not manifest itself overnight, and future solutions will not depend on only one president's administration. Internally, cartel leadership retains all of the money, control and benefits from the enterprise and its cadre are very small. 16 Underprivileged workers, far lower in the hierarchy and widely spread across the country, handle the grunt-work of production, transportation, and sales. 17 This organizational structure insulates leadership from the effects of street interdiction. However, it is vulnerable when intense cartel competition or law enforcement causes chaos and instability. Once threatened, the leadership cell augments itself with more security, making its location and movements more conspicuous, and therefore, more susceptible to arrest.
DISCUSSION

18
Cartels dynamically change their composition as threats to their organizations evolve.
Today cartels must battle for territory, evade law enforcement, and compete with other South
American organizations, which continuously interrupt the balance of power. 19 These conditions resulted in the partnership of several amicable cartels, which can be seen with the primary east and west coast organizations. However, cartel allegiances are for business first, as they share risks and markets only to protect profits.
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The cartels' illicit finances depend on the corrupted businesses and institutions that create a 'state criminalization,' silently supporting the drug enterprise. 21 Corruption in
Mexico controls every facet of society, such as police, judges, state and local governments, as well as commercial banking, real estate and private industry. 22 On May 19, 1997,
Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin eloquently said:
Money laundering is the process that enables drug and gun traffickers and terrorist groups to convert illegal and unusable proceeds into usable funds. It is the 'life blood' of organized crime. But it is also the 'Achilles heel', as it gives us a way to attack the leaders of criminal organizations. While the drug kingpin and other bosses of organized crime may be able to separate themselves from street level criminal activity, they cannot separate themselves from the profits of that activity. 23 In the recent past, cartels easily laundered profits from banks inside the United States. with the government, communicated with banners and letters found in the street saying the cartel had 'dissolved'. The authorities do not believe the claims, nor do they intend to negotiate, but regardless of the author, it reflects an underlying cartel need for legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
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On August 27, 2011, in reaction to a recent cartel attack on a casino that killed over 50 people, former president Vicente Fox expressed his desire for an open discussion regarding the feasibility of an amnesty agreement for the cartels through a government truce.
Fox offered an attractive alternative to President Calderon's war on cartels, which has taken over 35,000 lives under his watch. In response to the ex-president's plea for peace, federal security official Alejandro Piore remarked that cartels will not accept any truce terms until they have no choice left but to negotiate.
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If President Calderon wants to address his country's organized crime situation, reduce violence and economic dependence on drug trafficking, he must invite cartel negotiations.
As mentioned, cartels have no reason to consider alternative plans until Calderon threatens their means for organized crime, corruption, and influence. A recommended course of action is Calderon's implementation of a bold federal anti-money laundering campaign that stops 42 Associated Press, "Mexican Government: La Familia cartel in retreat," (January 25, 2011) 43 Associated Press, "Ex-Mexico Prez Suggests Truce with Drug Cartels," (August 27, 2011) cartel cash flow throughout the country. Additionally, a program of poverty reduction and homogenous distribution of wealth will be critical to raising Mexico's GDP and the continuation of successful anti-narcotics efforts. 44 Affirmative actions such as these, to and the threatened environment it thrives on will be a thing of the past.
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategically, the cartel system is holding Mexico back from achieving its potential in the global market place. Cartel influence hampers legitimate business competition.
Violence, combined with rampant corruption, creates insecurity and discourages economic progress in Mexico.
Mexico's track record of poor tax collection and its growing pool of informal cartel workers merely add to the country's economic predicament. Potentially, the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' will widen, and result in greater instability, as the disenfranchised poor see fewer and fewer economic alternatives and opportunities.
The Mexican government's current initiatives in the fight against cartels with the use of force must continue, but military and law enforcement efforts alone are not enough to yield lasting success. In order to regain its ability to govern, specifically with a secure tax revenue base, the first step is to break up the unchecked money laundering practices and apply pressure to cartel illicit finance. Second, the creation of employment through government sponsored infrastructure development programs will start the transition of informal workers into fully represented constituents. Third, the government of Mexico must initiate negotiations with cartel leadership in true faith, to explore mutually favorable conditions leading to its participation in an orderly society. Only then will cartel influence be diminished for the long run.
